Mario Götze lines up his World Cup-winning goal in the 113th minute of Germany's 1-0 triumph over Argentina. (So what, if I had to add the umlaut myself to Mario's last name --rsb.)
The
2014 World Cup final offered a perfect contrast of modern football
tactics: the attack-minded possession machine of Germany against a
defensively organized, deadly-on-the-counter Argentina. Germany won, 1-0
in extra time, but not before being frustrated by Argentina, which
missed chances of its own to win.
Wingers Enzo Pérez and Ezequiel Lavezzi switched sides
from where they played in the semifinal against the Netherlands,
allowing the more conservative Pérez to play closer to Javier Mascherano
to counteract Germany’s right side of Thomas Müller and Philipp Lahm.
Argentina’s midfielders dropped close to the defenders,
restricting space between lines for Germany. Benedikt Höwedes and the
rest of the back line slid to cover the gap created by Lahm’s forward
presence, allowing Argentina to break down the right through Lavezzi and
Lionel Messi. That created a couple important chances in the first half,
with Gonzalo Higuaín missing one in front of goal and finishing another
from an offside position. Jérôme Boateng also saved off the line from
Messi in the opening 45 minutes.
With Alejandro Sabella’s team in a compact shape, Germany
played primarily down the flanks. The ball traversed Zone 14 (the
central space on top of the penalty area) only glancingly and in transit
from side to side. Of Germany’s touches, 58 were in the attacking half,
aided by the team's usual high defensive line that includes center
backs willing to feature in the build-up and Golden Glove winner Manuel
Neuer prowling behind.
When Christoph Kramer left the match with a head injury, Mesut Özil
moved into central midfield from the central-winger type of role he
played for the majority of the World Cup. The early sub of Kramer, a
last-minute replacement for the injured Sami Khedira, turned out to be a
blessing for Germany and Özil, who was thrust into his best position as
a playmaker.
He still drifted wide as a result of Argentina’s shape and
Mascherano’s presence in his new starting position, but Özil created
two scoring chances, the most on his team. Both were cutback balls to
Toni Kroos making late runs from deeper in midfield.
Kroos’ delayed runs found space on top of Argentina’s
retreating midfield line. His most frequent pass was a diagonal ball
from left of center to the right flank, trying to spring Müller and Lahm
down the wing. Meanwhile, Bastian Schweinsteiger played as a
distributing holding midfielder.
All three German central midfielders completed nearly 90
percent of their passes, with Özil finding more success after switching
positions (88 percent) than before (76 percent). However, their ball
circulation slowed from the first half to the second, resulting in a
tempo that suited Argentina’s more defensive approach to the match.
With Sergio Agüero’s introduction, Pérez moved to a
central position next to Mascherano, further clogging space for the
German attack. Argentina moved to 4-3-3 with Messi as a false nine, and
it had the most control over the match between minutes 45 and 75, as the
match slowed down and stopped frequently due to fouls and injuries.
Germany created a false-nine attacking situation of its
own when Mario Götze came in for Miroslav Klose in the waning moments
before extra time. Germany tried to re-ignite the pace, but Argentina
succeeded in slowing the match down again — until Götze finally struck
late in the second period of extra time, in a similar period as Andrés
Iniesta did for Spain four years earlier.
It was Götze’s dynamic movement as the untraditional
center forward that created the goal, along with a brave run from fellow
substitute André Schürrle. Schürrle entered the match when Özil moved
to the middle, providing Germany with the same type of wide threat on
the left as it already had on the right with Müller.
That allowed Germany to stretch the field and, as a result, the Argentine back four.
On the goal, Götze began centrally, pulling to the left
flank as Schürrle retreated into midfield to find the ball. When
Schürrle dribbled toward the wing, Götze cut inside into the open space
in Argentina’s defense. Three defenders converged on Schürrle, leaving
space for Götze behind Martín Demichelis.
The gap between center backs Demichelis and Ezequiel Garay
grew larger as Demichelis was caught ball-watching, and Schürrle found
Götze with a chipped ball over the defenders. The ball was right on his
chest, but he still needed a world-class first touch and finish past
goalkeeper Sergio Romero, who seemed unable to decide whether he should
pressure or stay on his line.
Nonetheless, rather than waiting for the opponent to
concede possession and attack against the run of play, Joachim Löw set
his team up to dictate terms and push the game. The early Champions
League exit from a possession-oriented, fluid-attacking Bayern Munich in
the spring showed teams in that mold don’t always win, as the margin
for error is smaller in a high-risk approach.
Germany did what Bayern couldn’t do, receiving just reward
for the nation’s positive approach that began with a developmental
system overhaul after finishing bottom of its group at Euro 2000. After
rebuilding from the bottom 14 years ago, when most of the current
squad’s players were still in the academies, Germany made history as the
first European team to win a World Cup hosted in the Americas.
VIDEO: FOLLOW THIS LINK: Three Thoughts on the 2014 World Cup after Germany wins its 4th title
- Is Germany positioned for a lengthy reign?
- What does the USA's future hold?
- And what more can FIFA do about head injuries?
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